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Capitalism serves as the driving force of the United States economy, where for-profit 
firms dominate the market. However, it is a much different scenario in the healthcare industry, 
because not-for-profits account for a large share of the market. Additionally, healthcare is the 
largest nonprofit service sector, accounting for 60 percent of all nonprofit revenue and more than 
25 percent of all private charitable contributions.1  Healthcare continues to represent a large 
portion of the nonprofit service sector and the spending on healthcare in the United States 
continues to increase at a rapid rate. From 1965 to 1996 healthcare spending increased from 
$230.3 (In billions of 1996 dollars) to $1,035, which is an increase of 349 percent; this increase 
nearly doubles the nation’s gross domestic national product.  
Hospitals are the single largest component of the healthcare sector, receiving 35 percent 
of the $1.035 trillion (1996 dollars) in health care spending, or roughly $362.3 billion, making 
hospitals considerably prominent in the nonprofit arena. There are three classifications of the 
ownership of hospitals: (1) Nonprofits, which account for 50 percent of all hospitals (2) 
Government, which accounts for 31 percent of all hospitals and (3) For-profits, which only 
account for 19 percent of all hospitals. (Based off of 1996 spending)2     
Advocates of not-for-profits believe that the non-distribution constraint allows the 
mission of the nonprofits to focus on serving the community, with excess revenue being pumped 
back into the community, resulting in a higher societal benefit due to increased uncompensated 
                                               
1
  Salamon, Lester. “America’s Nonprofit Sector: A Primer” 2nd Edition. The Foundation Center (1999). 
Pgs. 77-80 
 
2
  Salamon, Lester. “America’s Nonprofit Sector: A Primer” 2nd Edition. The Foundation Center (1999). 
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care rates, and programs designed to educate the community. Also, the theory behind not-for-
profits is that they focus on output maximization rather than profit maximization.3 Therefore not-
for-profits receive tax exemption.    
If the healthcare sector has been significantly influenced by nonprofits for years, then the 
issue at hand would be asking why the conversions of hospitals from nonprofit into for-profit 
status are being criticized so significantly. As discussed by Thorpe, Florence, and Seiber (2000), 
the level of uncompensated care decreases when converting a nonprofit to a for-profit.  
Advocates such as Young and Desai (1999) suggest that “non-profit conversions do not, on 
average, reduce community benefit relative to uncompensated care, prices, or 
unprofitable/nonreimbursable services”. Community benefit is defined as any program and 
service “designed to improve health in communities and increase access to health care.”4 
This paper attempts to determine whether the conversion of not-for-profit into for-profit 
hospitals negatively affects the output of community benefits or if it is actually beneficial. One 
reason there may not be a negative impact is that for-profit hospitals are significantly more 
operationally efficient, consistently containing lower operating costs. Also, for-profits provide 
community benefit in the form of property taxes, where the revenue from these taxes is dispersed 
into the surrounding community. In addition, many researchers have found that for-profits often 
times produce levels of uncompensated care that are similar to the non-profits. An explanation 
for this is due to the relatively low variable costs of patients. The largest expenses in hospitals 
                                               
3
 Harrison, Teresa and Lybecker, Kristina. “The Effect of the Nonprofit Motive on Hospital Competitive 
Behavior” Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy. Volume 4, Issue 1. 2005.   
 
4
 The Healing Ministry of Catholic Health Care . 
http://www.chausa.org/Pub/MainNav/ourcommitments/CommunityBenefits/ (2007).  Accessed on 
12/15/07.  
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are their fixed costs, meaning an additional patient has a relatively small impact on the cost. Not 
only will this paper focus primarily on the output of health care services in the two ownership 
structures, but it will also introduce a new tax incentive that may encourage participation of 
charitable care, which in turn would benefit the community.      
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Three distinct differences distinguish a nonprofit firm from a for-profit firm. First, non-
profits must obtain start-up capital from donations because they do not have the power to borrow 
capital on the premise that the firm will pay it back with future profits. Secondly, due to the non-
distribution constraint, nonprofits are not allowed to pay out cash dividends from any profit the 
company may earn, rather they must reinvest back into the company. Lastly, if a nonprofit firm 
is sold, the proceeds cannot be paid to a set of owners.5 Essentially, these three major 
characteristics of nonprofits affect the overall operations of the hospital. The differences in the 
structural organization also affect the vision of a company.  
 The missions of not-for-profits and for-profits differ significantly. Due to the non-
distribution constraint, all not-for-profit missions are primarily similar around the idea of output 
maximization, where the firm attempts to maximize the amount of services that it can provide to 
the community. For-profits firms are created around the premise of profit maximization, 
producing at a level that yields the maximum profit. Upon first glance, it may appear that not-
for-profits should provide the most community benefit, at the lowest cost; however, studies have 
both proven and disproven this conjecture. 
                                               
5
 Pauly, Mark. Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets. The American Economic Review, 1987 – JSTOR. Pg 
257  
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 The idea that the structure of not-for-profits increases community benefits is one of the 
significant reasons why they receive tax exemptions. Since the tax exemption status of not-for-
profits cut a significant amount of their costs, they should be able to provide more community 
benefits. Ultimately, hospitals’ services can yield three types of community benefits; 
uncompensated care, net prices, and unprofitable/nonreimbursable services. In short, 
uncompensated care is defined as any charitable care that is provided to individuals who cannot 
afford the services. Net prices are looked at because the lower the price of services, then the 
more people can afford it. The unprofitable/nonreimbursable services include the programs that 
are developed to increase community knowledge and raise awareness about various problems. 
Together, all three of these outputs help create some benefit for the community.  
Kurt (1997) attempts to define the social responsibility of hospitals and compares how 
for-profit and not-for-profit institutions adhere to his definition. He believes that the social 
responsibility of hospitals is two-dimensional, the first dimension is meant “to protect and 
enhance organization assets while maximizing community benefit.”6 He argues that this can 
most effectively be accomplished by controlling costs and improving efficiency.  
In his research, Kurt conducts a comparison of a for-profit endoscopy physician’s clinic 
and a not-for profit hospital. Evidently, the for-profit clinic was owned by the physicians who 
have an interest in the financial health of their company. This translated into them constantly 
finding ways to use supplies more effectively and reduce the cost of the procedure, which ended 
up being 35% lower than it cost the nonprofit. The nonprofit company he examined was a larger, 
wealthier company that had issues using its money for the community.  Consequently, 
                                               
6
 Darr, Kurt. “The Social Responsibility of Hospitals” Hospital Topics; Winter97, Vol. 75 Issue 1. 
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disagreements arose between members of the board and hospital managers regarding where 
monies should be allocated and what new programs should start, leading to little to no production 
of community benefit. As a result, the lack of management structure and bottom line decisions 
prevented the hospital from following its mission. Furthermore, the second dimension is 
described as “the organizations objective to protect the commonwealth.” The author introduces 
an interesting argument, claiming that non-profits lack the economic incentive and instead focus 
on feeling good about themselves rather than concentrating on performing well and efficiently.7 
Young and Desai (1999) focus on three specific outputs that yield community benefit; 
uncompensated care, net prices, and unprofitable/nonreimbursable services. The first output, 
uncompensated care, is one of the most widely controversial concerns with nonprofit 
conversions. The belief is that once a company converts into for-profit ownership status, the 
level of uncompensated care will be reduced. The next output, price, was determined by looking 
at the net revenue per patient. Lastly, the study looked at the unprofitable/nonreimbursable 
services provided by the converted hospitals. These services include but are not limited to 
emergency/trauma care, neonatal care, and substance abuse programs. In general, these services 
are directed at the general public to increase knowledge and raise awareness. The researchers 
concluded, “conversions in the short term did not have an effect on uncompensated care, prices, 
or availability of unprofitable/nonreimbursable services”8. This study also looked at the long-
term results to reject the claim that for-profit firms are comparable in the short term due to 
government imposed regulations. The analysis found that the long-term rates were similar to the 
                                               
7
 Darr, Kurt. “The Social Responsibility of Hospitals” Hospital Topics; Winter97, Vol. 75 Issue 1. 
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results of the short term leading to the conclusion that both the short-term and long-term 
conversions did not negatively impact community benefits.     
A study conducted by Thorpe, Florence, and Seiber (2000) analyzed 127 hospital 
conversions from 1991 – 1997 to disprove the study by Young and Desai (1999). The 
researchers’ argument is based on the conjecture that, “for-profit hospitals and systems have a 
fiduciary obligation to maximize shareholders’ wealth. This obligation may run counter to the 
provision of community benefits, such as care for the uninsured.”9 Within this study, the 
researchers conducted an analysis on data that they collected from the AHA Annual Survey of 
Hospitals for 1990-1997 and found differing results from Young and Desai (1999). By the end of 
the study, the researchers were able to conclude that conversions of not-for-profit to for-profit 
hospitals had a negative effect on the provision of charitable care.   
One of the explanations they provide for their contradictory results centers around the 
idea that previous studies have focused on limited, single state (Florida) or three states (Texas, 
Florida, and California), sample sizes. So, their study was modified to be more comprehensive 
and focuses on nationwide data, 60 percent of the not-for-profit conversions since 1990 have 
occurred outside of Texas, Florida, and California. Furthermore, this study includes more 
measures of output such as: hospital operating margins, revenues, expenses, and total adjusted 
admissions.10  
                                               
9
  Thorpe, Florence, and Seiber. “Hospital Conversions, Margins, and the Provision of Uncompensated 
Care” Health Affairs. November/December 2000. Volume 19, Number 6.  
 
 
10
 Thorpe, Florence, and Seiber. “Hospital Conversions, Margins, and the Provision of Uncompensated 
Care” Health Affairs. November/December 2000. Volume 19, Number 6.  
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Due to the complexity of finding the exact dollar of charitable services provided, 
uncompensated care is a total of charity care and bad debt. Thus, the result of the study shows 
that the uncompensated care rates of not-for-profit to for-profit conversions are lower than 
hospitals that have always been not-for-profit. They have found that 4.7% of converted hospitals 
total expenses are uncompensated care, whereas uncompensated care for not-for profits, accounts 
for 5.3% of the total expenses. Furthermore, the profit margins for converted hospitals are 8.7% 
compared to the 4.7% margin of not-for-profit hospitals.   The increased profit margins represent 
how much for-profits mark up the price of their services, in order to pay shareholders’ and higher 
wage differentials. Also, it is interesting to note that the price of services for not-for-profits and 
for-profits are very similar, the for-profits receive higher margins because of their cost efficiency 
in production.  
The official ruling position of the IRS on not-for-profit hospitals, “required any hospital 
seeking exemption under Code 501(c)(3) to be ‘operated to the extent of its financial ability for 
those not able to pay for services rendered’”.11  The stance of the IRS was that any activity which 
was intended to provide relief of the poor that constituted a charitable purpose. Initially, the IRS 
did not specify the quantity of charity care that was adequate; however, if a not-for-profit 
hospital was to be audited, and the hospital lacked community programs, auditing agents would 
recommend removal of the tax exemption status.   
Thirty-five years ago, the Internal Revenue Service adopted the community benefit 
standard, Revenue Ruling 69-545, for tax exemption of hospitals. 12 The standard was developed 
as a means to ensure that not-for-profits were engaging in community activities that warranted 
                                               
11
  Colombo, John. “The Failure of Community Benefit”. Health Matrix. Vol 15:29. 2005   
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 Colombo, John. “The Failure of Community Benefit”. Health Matrix. Vol 15:29. 2005   
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them to receive tax exemption status.  However, this amendment was riddled with issues.  In 
particular, the amendment lost focus of providing charitable care to the needy and expanded its 
exemption qualification activities to any conduct that promoted health in general. This 
broadening of the exemption standards negatively impacted the level of charitable care.  The 
quantitative requirements outlined by the Revenue Ruling 69-545 were that a not-for-profit 
hospital must have: a community board, operational acute-care facilities with an open emergency 
room, and participate in Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement programs.  
One factor not accounted for in many of the analyses is lost tax revenue due to the tax 
exemptions. Does the increase in uncompensated care from nonprofits outweigh the lost revenue 
because of their tax exemption status? While tax revenue is not an intended output of community 
benefit for a hospital, it does put revenue directly into the surrounding community, increasing the 
benefits produced by for-profit hospitals.   
Bramer (2005) used the results of previous studies to argue that not-for-profits are not 
producing community benefits at the level they should. His paper looked at the community 
benefit of the nonprofits and if they were meeting the requirements outlined by the IRS. He 
found that in 2002, the nonprofit industry only spent 5.4% of its overall expenses on 
uncompensated care, the lowest percentage in a decade. This low percentage came even though 
the profit margins were up from 4.2% to 4.4%. If this hospitals truly acted in the manner not-for-
profits are supposed to, spending all of the profits on the community, then why are they 
operating with higher margins?  Similarly, another study revealed gaps ranging from $5.8 
million to $9.9 million between the expected community benefit and their actual spending.  
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On the other hand, for-profit hospitals were $1.2 billion over their expected contribution. 
For-profit hospitals are not expected to provide any charitable care to the community, the only 
community benefit they are expected to produce is a result of the taxes imposed on them. Any 
additional services they provide for community benefit is considered additional to what is 
expected. The author also presented another authors interesting solution to the problem, which 
yields benefits from both ownership structures. All hospitals should be made into for-profit status 
and a “Receivable from Society” account could be established. The hospitals could then book all 
healthcare rendered to the uninsured in this account. Any money collected from the uninsured or 
government taxes could then be subtracted from the account. Any money left in the account, the 
uncompensated care, could then be used as a tax credit.13 This proposition would help to capture 
the efficiency of for-profit hospitals, while promoting the incentive for charity care provision of 
not-for-profit hospitals.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
13
 Owens, Bramer. “The Plight of the Not-for-Profit” Journal of Healthcare Management; July/August 
2005. pgs 237-250. 
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THEORY AND DISCUSSION  
According to Santerre and Neun (2007) not-for-profits are especially prevalent in health 
care because of market failures that occur when for-profits control the market for hospital 
services. Market failure occurs as a result of three factors: (1) “The private market works best 
when all market participants are perfectly informed”14. Due to the complexity of health care 
services and the difficulty of determining exactly what type of services are needed, consumers 
usually possess imperfect and incomplete information. (2) The resource allocation of for-profits 
is based on the most profitable expenditure. Individuals that cannot afford the services often do 
not receive the care needed. (3) The presence of positive externalities also contributes to market 
failure. Resources are not being allocated efficiently when externalities are present. 15 More 
people demand health care than what is actually provided due to the expensive cost of medical 
services. The poor especially suffer because they rely mostly on inadequate government 
programs to pay or subsidize the cost of health care. Medicaid is a government program, targeted 
                                               
14Santerre, Rexford and Neun, Stephen (2007). Health Economics: Theories, Insights, and Industry 
Studies. 4th edition. Pg 82-83 
  
15
 Santerre, Rexford and Neun, Stephen (2007). Health Economics: Theories, Insights, and Industry 
Studies. 4th edition. Pg 82-83 
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at individuals and families with low income, which aid in the costs of health care. Funding for 
this $213 billion (2002 dollars) program comes from both the state and federal governments16. 
The impact of increasing Medicaid spending indicates a shortage of care provided. Baker and 
Royalty (2000) found that a 10% increase in Medicaid fees, increases physician office visits of 
the poor by 2.4%.17  
Not-for-profit hospitals serve to satisfy market demand, where positive externalities 
might exist and lead to an underproduction of health care.  The ownership structure of not-for-
profits induces quantity maximization rather than profit maximization.  The focus on quantity 
maximization encourages not-for-profit hospitals to provide health care to the community at a 
lower cost or in some cases free, increasing the contribution to the community benefit of a 
hospital, correcting for externalities. Figure-1 displays an output maximization model, assuming 
a downward-sloping demand curve. The price and quantity outputs represent the equilibrium 
points of a for-profit firm and a not-for-profit firm. The not-for-profit firm assumes a break even 
decision and must produce where (P = AC), the quantity maximization equilibrium.  
Figure-1: Output Maximization Model 
                                               
16
 Santerre, Rexford and Neun, Stephen (2007). Health Economics: Theories, Insights, and Industry 
Studies. 4th edition.  
 
17
 Santerre, Rexford and Neun, Stephen (2007). Health Economics: Theories, Insights, and Industry 
Studies. 4th edition. pg 270 
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This output maximization model compares profit maximizing (for-profit) and output 
maximizing (not-for-profit) firms. The y-axis represents the dollar per unit of health care 
services, and the x-axis represents the quantity of health care services provided, which will equal 
the number of patient-days provided by the firm. The two ownership structures yield different 
equilibrium price and quantity outputs. Many market conditions exist which alter output and 
prices of health services in a real market.  Furthermore, this graph assumes that the two firms 
offer perfectly substitutable goods.  
The not-for-profit firm produces where average cost (AC) and the average revenue (AR) 
or demand, intersect.  In this model the price and quantity of a quantity maximizing firm is 
represented by Pq and Qq.   Not-for-profit firms have an incentive to maximize their output due to 
the non-distribution constraint, which means that not-for profit firms cannot redistribute profit to 
the employees or executives of a firm.  
Number of 
patient 
Days (Q)    
MC 
AC 
MR 
P
Qq Q
 
P
Dollars 
per unit 
(P)  
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 Advocates of for-profit firms in the health care industry argue that firms that are driven 
by profit maximization produce nearly the same amount of community benefits as their not-for-
profit counterparts for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, in the short-run, for-profit firms are 
constantly looking for ways to reduce costs in order to increase its profit margin of services 
provided.  Second, fixed costs account for a majority of expenses in a hospital. The cost of an 
additional patient contains a relatively low marginal cost, meaning for-profits could provide 
similar charity levels as not-for-profits for a lower cost to the tax payers. Figure-2 adjusts for this 
and provides new equilibrium points for the for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.   
  
 
Figure-2: Adjusted Output Maximization Model  
 
This model includes two adjustments which advocates of for-profits have argued 
differentiate the two ownership structures. The first adjustment represents the increase in fixed 
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cost for both firms. The biggest expenses for hospitals include the acquisition and payments of 
costly medical equipment and facilities. The addition of patients does not have a large impact on 
the total cost, but it reduces the opportunity cost of providing charitable services. This graph 
assumes the notion that for-profit hospitals contain lower costs is true. The theory revolves 
around the idea that the owners and executives of for-profit companies are more invested in the 
company compared to executives in not-for-profit firms. This investment in the company 
motivates employees to seek cost saving techniques in order to maximize profit in the short run. 
However in the long run, firms enter the market when economic profit is present, which 
effectively lowers the price of services. As a result, the amount of services provided increases 
until the equilibrium price and quantity is reached.   
The not-for-profit hospital still sets the equilibrium price and quantity where average cost 
intersects the demand curve. Additionally, the for-profit hospital produces where marginal cost 
intersects marginal revenue. However, new equilibrium points are derived due to adjustments of 
the fixed cost and average cost. The not-for-profit firm (Pq and Qq) produces at a level in the 
short-run, where the price is lower and the quantity is larger relative to the for-profit firm (Pπ and 
Qπ). However, the difference between the price and quantity levels is narrow.  
The ownership structure of a not-for-profit requires the firm to produce at a level that 
provides zero economic profit. In order to do so, a firm may provide charitable care without 
expecting a patient to pay the hospital back for those services. This is to engage in Qπ charitable 
activities which increase the hospitals’ contribution to community benefit. However, the tax 
exemptions that not-for-profits receive from the government also reduce not-for-profits 
contribution to community benefits. A for-profit firm must pay federal and state taxes. One tax in 
particular, property tax, goes back into the community from where the taxes are drawn from. 
16 | P a g e  
 
This may be in the form of income to schools, parks, roads, etc. Not-for-profits benefit the 
community only if the amount of benefit they provide from charitable care and lower prices, 
outweighs the community benefit that is lost due to tax exemption. For-profit firms are required 
to pay the taxes which increase their contribution to community benefit. The taxes serve as a 
form of government intervention to correct for the externalities that would occur if the market 
were left alone.  
The not-for-profit firms have the incentive to increase community benefit and for-profit 
firms are driven by profit maximization, which constantly pushes them to be operated more 
efficient through allocation and production decisions. The motive of not-for-profits is on track to 
maximize community benefit; however, due to the lack of financial investment of the board of 
trustees and executives, often times they run at increased levels of fixed costs and variable costs, 
relative to for-profit hospitals. “Improving efficiency in the organization and delivery of services 
is the greatest contribution hospital managers can make; the result will be increased access and 
affordability of care to all segments”18. The question one asks is- how can the government 
capture the efficiency of for-profits, while encouraging the community focus of not-for-profits? 
The answer would be a tax incentive system that is not delivered until charitable care is 
provided. This would address the problem of nonprofits free-riding the tax exemption status, 
while promoting for-profits to provide services that would increase the community benefit.   
Critics of converting not-for-profit hospitals into for-profit ownership status believe that 
removing the incentive for quantity maximization contains a negative effect on the poor. With 
profit margins driving the operation of for-profits, the poor suffer. However, to address this 
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 Darr, Kurt. “The Social Responsibility of Hospitals”. Hospital Topics. Winter 97. Vol. 75 Issue 1.   
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issue, state governments are beginning to pass legislation to correct for the problem of 
underproduction. For instance, California passed legislation which set up a “system of mandatory 
Attorney General consent for sale of non-profit hospitals to for-profit and non-profit entities”19. 
The increased regulation and oversight by the Attorney general, increases public disclosures and 
enforces guidelines that the for-profit owners must follow. Conditions that follow a transfer 
include:  (1) continuation of levels of charity care (2) continuation of the most important hospital 
programs (ER, Intensive Care Units, etc.) and (3) continuation of major community benefit 
programs (Outpatient Services, Diabetes Programs, etc.). In conjunction with these conditions, 
hospitals must also contain a local governing advisory board that reflects the community. 
Furthermore, the hospitals must use its proceeds in a way that is consistent with the previous 
hospital services. The for-profit hospitals are expected to contribute at equal levels of the 
preexisting not-for-profit hospital, without substantial donations or tax breaks.20   
“Tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals is based on the anachronistic policies that have 
lead to inefficiency and waste in the health-care system. Moreover, the federal tax 
treatment of nonprofit hospitals has lead to the counter-intuitive result that nonprofit 
hospitals provide less charity care than for-profit hospitals.”21  
The issue with the current tax exemption standards is they are not adequately enforced or 
regulated. Once a company obtains not-for-profit status, it is easy to remain exempt without 
adhering to the standards laid out by the IRS. As a result, many not-for-profit hospitals are taking 
tax revenue from the community without fulfilling their community requirements. Consequently, 
this inefficiency leads to underproduction of charitable care provided.  
                                               
19
 Fremont-Smith, Marion R.; Urban, Mark; Praeger, Sandy. The Challenge of For-Profit Health Care 
Conversions. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Winter2003 Supplement, Vol. 31 Issue 4, p49-50 
20
 Fremont-Smith, Marion R.; Urban, Mark; Praeger, Sandy. The Challenge of For-Profit Health Care 
Conversions. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Winter2003 Supplement, Vol. 31 Issue 4, p49-50 
 
21
 Gilbert, Charles. “Health-Care Reform and the Nonprofit Hospital: Is Tax-exempt Status Still 
Warranted”. Urb. Law.  1994  
  
18 | P a g e  
 
In 1994, it was estimated that the aggregate value of capital tax exemptions for not-for-
profit hospitals was $6.3 billion from income taxes and property taxes22. Bellandi (1998) looked 
at conversions from a different perspective than most studies of turning for-profit hospitals into 
not-for-profit status. She found that “uncompensated care increased in most cases, but those 
increases rarely offset the loss of property taxes in a community”23. Discrepancies exist between 
many of the tests, whether uncompensated care rates increase or decrease; however, all of the 
analyses agree that not-for-profits are not providing enough charitable care.  
 Furthermore, converting the ownership structure of not-for-profit hospitals is an 
appropriate step in the right direction in order to maximize the benefit to the community by 
minimizing the positive externalities. Figure-3 represents the current state of the hospital market, 
and illustrates the effect of the positive externalities created by the underproduction of health 
care services to the poor and uninsured. It shows that the quantity being produced is not the 
socially optimal level.    
Figure-3: Current Market of Charitable Care 
                                               
22
 Nesvisky, Matt. “The Value of Tax-breaks for Not-For-Profits”. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Accessed on December 5, 2007.  
 
23
 Bellandi, Deanna. “Reversing Conversions”. Modern Healthcare; 10/05/98, Vol 28 Issue 40 
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This model highlights the positive externalities that are present with the current hospital 
market structure, large concentration of not-for-profit hospitals. In this graph, consumers 
purchasing decision is driven by maximizing utility; whereas, producers supply at a quantity 
where they are maximizing profits, which results in an equilibrium point where the marginal 
private benefit (MPB) equals marginal private cost (MPC).The equilibrium point produces at P0 
and Q0. However, this is an inefficient market outcome because marginal social benefit (MSB) 
exceeds the marginal social cost because of the external benefits of having a community full of 
healthy individuals. The socially optimal equilibrium occurs where MSB=MSC, at P1 and Q1. If 
left alone, the hospital market may have a tendency to under produce charitable care. Triangle 
ABC represents the amount of charitable care that needs to be provided in order to correct for the 
positive externality.  
B 
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With more than 70 million uninsured or underinsured people in the US24 and funding of 
government programs is questionable, new techniques need to be developed to encourage the 
most output for the lowest cost. As previously mentioned, for-profits could produce the same 
amount of charitable care as not-for-profits, at a lower cost. Additionally, if there is truly an 
underproduction of charitable services, then for-profits could provide more services for the same 
cost. The approach that would encourage charitable production while utilizing efficiency would 
be converting all hospitals’ to for-profit ownership status. Monies that originally were not 
recognized as tax revenue for the government, for instance property tax of not-for-profit 
institutions, could be placed into an account designated for tax subsidies to the for-profit 
hospitals for providing charitable care. The cost would be no greater for the government. By 
utilizing the efficiency of for-profit hospitals, more care could be provided to the poor, 
increasing the benefit to the community. This subsidy program would effectively lower the cost 
of providing charitable care, which would assist in the pursuit for producing at the socially 
optimal level.  
 
Figure-4: Subsidies as a Corrective Instrument 
                                               
24
 Wood, Kevin. “Legislatively-Mandated Charity Care for Nonprofit Hospitals: Does Government 
Intervention Make any Difference”. Summer 2001. Volume 20:3 
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This graph captures the impact of the hospital market when a subsidy program is 
instituted. P1 represents the price that would be present if the hospital market provided optimal 
amount of charitable care. The actual price, prior to a subsidization, is shown at the equilibrium 
P0. This is the point in which the current market is producing charitable care. If a subsidization 
program was put into effect, the marginal MSC line would shift rightward, as a result of the 
reduction of the cost to the hospital in providing charitable care. Because of the per-unit 
subsidization of hospital services, the market price of the services decreases from P0 to PE. This 
reduction in cost, results in the quantity of services provided increasing from Q0 to QE and the 
production efficiency exists at the point where MSB=MSC. Subsidies can be a useful way to 
promote socially beneficial activities that might otherwise be undervalued in the hospital market. 
This subsidy, due to its price reduction incentive, would work to encourage for-profits hospitals 
to engage in charitable care, increasing the quantity of health care provided to the socially 
optimal level represented at QE.  
Using government subsidies to correct for positive externalities is not a new approach. In 
fact, the government subsidizes many industries today. One example of subsidization 
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implemented by the government is the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR), 
which has supplied more than $7 billion to small high technology firms between 1983 and 
199725.  Government supported subsidy programs may also be an effective and necessary method 
to correct for the externalities in the health care market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                               
25
  Lerner, J. “The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR Program”  
Journal of Business- UChicago Press. 1999.  
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Not-for-profit hospitals were primarily used as an instrument to correct market failures 
that existed when only for-profit hospitals were in control of the market, which resulted in a 
shortage of health care services being provided. However, times have changed and the need of 
not-for-profit hospitals is now being challenged. Regarding scope and numbers, both government 
and nonprofit hospitals have been steadily declining the past 15 years. For-profits, on the other 
hand, have been growing substantially.26 This is partly due to the acquisition of not-for-profits by 
for-profits. The conversions of the ownership structure for the hospitals have come under 
increasing criticism by advocates of not-for-profit hospitals.  
The models in this literature developed the idea of why not-for-profit hospitals were 
created. However, with the ever increasing production efficiency and cost reduction strategies of 
for-profits, for-profits are now positioned to provide more care to the community for the same, if 
not lower, cost per unit of service provided. Not-for-profit hospitals simply have lost the focus to 
produce charitable care for a variety of reasons. One of those reasons is the broad definition of 
community benefits, outlined by the IRS.  With the broad definition, many times the poor suffer 
at the expense of the executives and board of trustees of the not-for-profit hospitals.  
Socially speaking, it is important to ensure that an adequate amount of charitable care is 
being provided to the community. Prehistoric methods for providing charitable care and a less 
prosperous economy have resulted in a deficiency of charitable care being provided. In order to 
counter this deficiency in provision of care, new methods, like the tax subsidization program, 
need to be implemented by the government. The subsidization program that was introduced in 
                                               
26
 Salamon, Lester. “America’s Nonprofit Sector: A Primer” 2nd Edition. The Foundation Center (1999) 
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this paper, reduces the cost of providing charitable care, shifting the marginal social to the right. 
The shift in the MSC curve increases quantity closer to the equilibrium output.  
The conversion of not-for-profit to for-profit hospitals is the first step in implementing 
this program. If all hospitals were transitioned into for-profit status, the same amount of 
charitable care could be provided for a lower cost to the government. Any additional funds, 
created by the increased tax revenue from the previous not-for-profit hospitals, could be 
reinvested into the tax subsidy program. This paper is only to be used as an introduction for the 
policy. Before implementing the subsidization program further studies need to be completed. It 
would be beneficial to look at the exact cost of health care services and how large of a 
government subsidization would be needed to increase the quantity of health care services 
provided to reach the optimal level.  
Currently, the conversion of not-for-profit into for-profit hospitals has little to no affect 
on the provision of charitable care provided.  The tax subsidy program, if implemented, would 
increase the output of charitable services the hospital industry could provide. It may not be 
enough to completely correct for the positive externalities due to under production but it should 
help to minimize them at the least. Therefore, the conversion of not-for-profit hospitals into for-
profit hospitals could benefit the provision of charitable care in the long-run.  
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